The New Science of Market Design

The New Science of Market Design

In this workshop, we will discuss foundations and applications of of auction and matching market. We will first cover two theoretical pillars of modern market design: the theory of stable matching and the Vickery-Clark- Grove mechanism.

We will discuss how these two theories inspired various real-world marketplace designs, from the allocation of doctors to hospitals, to real-world auctions. We then cover three cutting edge research on designing computationally challenging marketplaces: First, we will see how auctions are used in online advertising marketplaces.

Then we will go through the problem of dynamic matching on stochastic networks, with applications in ride-sharing and kidney exchange. Finally, we will analyze the latest US spectrum auction – the most complex auction in human history – from a theoretical and practical perspective. Real-world and computational challenges of all applications will be discussed.

 

Location: Tehran

Date: Sep 4th 2016